The Mencius #PHIL320S21

In sections 6A1 to 6A4, Mencius examines several analogies regarding human nature and whether it is inherently good or bad. These sections seemed to follow an interrogative format: the presentation of an analogy of Gaozi’s followed by a question challenging its validity. Though some of the arguments Mencius makes were not entirely evident to me, there were several that offered clear, logical rebuttals to Gaozi’s notions on human nature. The second assertion that Mencius addresses can be paraphrased as follows: “Water will flow in the direction of the channel it passes through.” In this scenario, water symbolizes human nature. Water flows freely through channels that go east and west (between good and non-good) indiscriminately, meaning that human nature does not explicitly distinguish between good and bad. In response, Mencius asks whether it is possible that water, in fact, flows downward. Furthermore, he claims that water may be splashed or churned upward by force. In other words, he believes that there are external forces acting upon each person’s nature, contrary to Gaozi’s concept of a passive nature that flows unpredictably.

Mencius’ argument of the four sprouts seeks to prove the inherent morality of human nature. Though I struggle with the assertion that man is inherently moral, Mencius’ four sprouts seem to align with a consequential perspective on human nature and how it is displayed in actions and feelings. In other words, each of Mencius’ sprouts has a causal relationship with humaneness, rightness, propriety, and wisdom respectively. The first argument seeks to address the question at hand: Is man moral by his nature? According to Mencius, all humans have a mind that cannot bear to see the suffering of others. For this reason, pity and compassion are the sprouts of humaneness. The empathetic response to suffering, then, is the one to which we are inherently prone. Similarly, the feeling of shame along with an aversion to that which is immoral are the sprouts to rightness. These two arguments seem negative in that they advise mostly on what is to be avoided in order to fulfill inherent morality. The third and fourth arguments seem predominantly meant as guides. For example, Mencius tells us that the acts of modesty and compliance are the sprouts of propriety and the sense of right and wrong are the sprouts of wisdom. These final two sprouts appear to fall under the category of virtues in that they must be practiced consistently to sprout their moral products. In contrast to the first two sprouts, the second two seem more catered to a worldview that grants greater autonomy to individuals in how their moral existence affects them.